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ERASTIAN AND HIGH CHURCH APPROACHES TO THE
LAW: THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CATEGORIES OF
ROBERT E. RODES, JR.
M. Cathleen Kaveny*
INTRODUCTION
It is a great honor for me to have been asked to contribute to this
issue of the Journal of Law and Religion focusing on the work of my
colleague and friend, Robert E. Rodes, Jr. In June 2006, Professor
Rodes celebrated his fiftieth anniversary as a member of the faculty of
Notre Dame Law School. His long career has marked him as a founding
father of interdisciplinary scholarship at the intersection of faith, law,
and morality-the very sort of scholarship which this journal is
dedicated to fostering and preserving.
The topics that Professor Rodes has considered over the years are
wide-ranging; for example, he has written insightfully on both sexual
ethics' and economic justice.2 The methods that he has used are diverse;
he has deftly deployed the tools of historiography3 as well as logic.
4
Moreover, the normative stances that he has taken defy location on the
normal liberal/conservative spectrum as it plays itself out in American
political life. He has argued in favor of a legal system that would
encourage a more traditional sexual morality, while emphasizing the
need to compassionately accommodate those whose lives do not
* John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law, Professor of Theology, University of
Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Indiana.
1. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Law and Chastity (Carolina Academic Press 2006).
2. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Law, History, and the Option for the Poor, 6 LOGOS
(USA) 61 (1985).
3. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., This House I Have Built: A Study of the Legal History of
Establishment in England (series) (consisting of Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Ecclesiastical
Administration in Medieval England: The Anglo-Saxons to the Reformation (U. Notre Dame Press
1977); Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Lay Authority and Reformation in the English Church: Edward I to
the Civil War (U. Notre Dame Press 1982); Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Law and Modernization in the
Church of England: Charles I to the Welfare State (U. Notre Dame Press 1991)) [hereinafter
Rodes, This House I have Built].
4. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr. & Howard Pospesel, Premises and Conclusions: Symbolic
Logic for LegalAnalysis (Prentice Hall 1997); Robert E. Rodes, Jr., De Re and De Dicto, 73 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 627 (1998).
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conform to its strictures.' He has also maintained the importance of
assessing social and economic structures from the perspective of the
most marginalized members of the society, without succumbing to
romantic illusions that technology, progress, or the dynamism of history
will eliminate class stratification and its ensuing divisions of humanity
into the "haves" and the "have nots. ' 6 His writings at the intersection of
law and religion reflect neither the Democratic Party nor the Republican
Party at prayer-and neither party at a town hall meeting, for that
matter.
Professor Rodes's work is holistic in that it stems from an
integrated vision of the nature and purpose of human flourishing, a
coherent account of why human beings frequently impede their own
flourishing and that of others, and a realistic understanding of both the
potential and limitations of human institutions, including the institutions
created and sustained by human law in all of its forms and
manifestations. The most succinct expression of the metaphysical world
view underlying his writings can be found in the Nicene Creed,7 which
is professed by most Christian denominations, including the Roman
Catholic community to which Rodes belongs.8 Rodes situates his
5. See e.g. Rodes, On Law and Chastity, supra n. 1.
6. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., In Defense of Liberation Theology, 170 Am. 18 (Feb. 5,
1994).
7. For more information, see T. Ryan, Nicene Creed, in New Catholic Encyclopedia vol. 10,
354 (Bernard L. Marthaler et al. eds., 2d ed., Thomson/Gale 2003).
8. Roman Catholics generally recite the Nicene Creed during the Liturgy of the Word in
Sunday Mass. The most commonly used text is as follows:
NICENE CREED:
We believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty,
maker of heaven and earth, of all that is seen and unseen.
We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only Son of God,
eternally begotten of the Father,
God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God,
begotten, not made, one in Being with the Father.
Through him all things were made.
For us men and for our salvation he came down from heaven:
by the power of the Holy Spirit
he was born of the Virgin Mary, and became man.
For our sake he was crucified under Pontius Pilate;
he suffered, died, and was buried.
On the third day he rose again in fulfillment of the Scriptures;
he ascended into heaven and is seated at the right hand of the Father.
He will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead,
and his kingdom will have no end.
We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the giver of life,
who proceeds from the Father and the Son.
With the Father and the Son he is worshiped and glorified.
He has spoken through the Prophets.
We believe in one holy catholic and apostolic Church.
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particular vocation as a lawyer, a scholar, and a Catholic layman within
this broad understanding of reality and the place of humanity within it.
It is important not to underestimate the complexity and nuance with
which Professor Rodes draws upon various aspects of his integrated
vocation to further our common scholarly reflection. At a 1995
symposium organized to discuss his work at the University of Notre
Dame, he reflected upon the thrust of his scholarly work:
My interest is that of a Christian looking at the role of the church
in society, rather than a student of society looking at the effect of
the church on society.... When church and society part company,
I go with the church, and not with society.9
One who reads this quotation out of context, without adequate
acquaintance with Professor Rodes's work might be tempted to think
that it was dedicated to advancing the interests and perspectives of the
institutional Church, as it understands them, in a secular environment
that is at best indifferent and at worst hostile to religious truths. Nothing
could be further from the truth. Rodes understands that the God who
created us and the God who redeems us in Jesus Christ are one and the
same. He therefore recognizes that the desire to know and love God,
and to serve those made in God's image and likeness, is not limited by
the boundaries of the institutional Church, although the institutional
church bears special responsibility for proclaiming Christ's teaching and
making available his sacraments until the end of time.
Moreover, Professor Rodes realizes that neither Church nor secular
society has been blessed with a perfect blueprint of what is to be done in
building up the kingdom of God, which will be fully realized only at the
end of time, in God's own time and manner, and by God's own grace.
In fact, Rodes's model of the Christian life is that of apilgrimage toward
the kingdom of God, a pilgrimage on which "we are called to pursue an
unknown end by inefficacious means."1° It is also his model of life in
general; he believes that "the pilgrimage . . . is intrinsic to the human
condition. It does not separate Christians in particular, or even believers
We acknowledge one baptism for the forgiveness of sins.
We look for the resurrection of the dead,
and the life of the world to come. [Amen.]
Nicene Creed, http://catholic-resources.org/ChurchDocs/Mass.htm#Word (accessed Mar. 23,
2007).
9. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Christian Jurisprudence of Robert E. Rodes, Jr., 73 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 737, 738 (1998) (quoting a recorded conversation of the symposium on Mar. 25, 1995).
10. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Pilgrim Law 11 (U. Notre Dame Press 1998) [hereinafter Rodes,
Pilgrim Law].
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in general, from a mass population headed in some other direction.""
Rodes's Christian faith in God's ultimate grace and mercy toward
humanity is complemented by a healthy humility regarding the mystery
of God's ways. That humility leads him to recognize and honor insight,
compassion, and wisdom where he finds it, both in the secular world and
in the Church. It also leads him to apply his own insight, compassion,
and wisdom wherever it is needed, both for the secular world and for the
church. 2
If we look at Rodes's body of work as a whole, we can divide it
into three basic groups. First, he has investigated the relationship of the
institutional Church and the broader society in a systematic and detailed
way. Most impressively, he has produced a massive and detailed
historical study of the established Church in England, which has given
him a tremendous factual background upon which to draw in
formulating his own normative reflections on the relationship of the
Church and society, particularly as that relationship is instantiated
through the law, both civil and canonical.' 3  In my judgment, this
historical study is immensely important for understanding his more
theoretical and explicitly normative work, because it reinforced his
understanding that human relationships, human events, and human
causality are complicated and frequently ambiguous. It also means that
the categories he develops in his normative work have grown
inductively as well as deductively.
Second, Rodes has devoted a great deal of time and energy to the
task of bringing the perspective of Christian anthropology and
eschatology to bear upon the legal enterprise. The fullest example of his
work falling into this category is his book, Pilgrim Law,14 which is the
most comprehensive articulation of his Christian jurisprudence. He
writes, "[the] principles of this pilgrim law should be regarded as
complementary to the more familiar principles of natural law and
sociological jurisprudence, rather than opposed to them."' 5  The five
principles of pilgrim law, I believe, illuminate Professor Rodes's
perspective on the course of human life more broadly. First, as I noted
11. Id. at 11-12.
12. For example, Rodes's understanding of the way in which social structures, including legal
structures, ought to incorporate an "option for the poor" is deeply influence by socialist political
philosophy, see Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist State (Praeger
1957), as well as by Christian liberation theology, see Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of
Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation (Orbis Books 1973).
13. Rodes, supra n. 3.
14. Rodes, Pilgrim Law, supra n. 10.
15. Id. at 11.
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above, he tells us that "the pilgrimage, along with its legal
consequences, is intrinsic to the human condition."' 6 Second, it is easier
to identify road blocks than final destinations. "[W]hile we are not to
know the end of our-and everyone's-pilgrimage, we can understand
the general direction well enough to recognize an obstacle when we see
one.""7 Third, obstacles can be both personal and social; "[t]hey are
often built into our economic, social, and political institutions."'
' 8
Fourth, "[a] Christian jurisprudence... must cope with tragedy. It must
bear witness to redemption, and, as far as possible, further it."19 Rodes
tells us that "[i]t is here that pilgrim law provides an essential
complement to natural law, which is prelapsarian in its outlook, and has
no answer to anyone's failure to live up to what it prescribes."2 ° Fifth,
and finally,
pilgrim law supports the open-endedness of the pilgrimage itself.
It opposes any philosophy, any politics, or any jurisprudence that
commits individuals or humanity in general to a known and
therefore spurious destiny, or to no destiny at all.21
Finally, Rodes has also dedicated significant effort to using the
intellectual skills he has acquired as a lawyer and a law professor to
illuminate questions and controversies that have arisen in our time
within religious communities, and in particular the Roman Catholic
community.22 Rodes argues, to my mind persuasively, that some
"important theological concepts have an inescapable juridical dimension
that must be recognized and addressed if the concepts are rightly to be
understood.2 a More specifically, he has contended that some of the
most neuralgic disputes about doctrinal and moral matters (e.g., the
status of non-Christian religions, the morality of the use of contraception
by married couples) can be more fruitfully understood if approached
with the analytical tools that allow us to distinguish among various types
of legal pronouncements, as well as to discern the type of response that
each type of pronouncement calls for. Rodes is not attempting to reduce
theology to law, anymore than he attempts to reduce law to theology.
16. Id. at 11-12.
17. Id. at 12.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 12-13.
20. Id. at 13.
21. Id.
22. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., What O'Clock I Say: Juridical Epistemics and the
Magisterium of the Church, 14 J.L. & Religion 285 (1999-2000) [hereinafter Rodes, What
O'Clock I Say?]; Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Juridical Elements in Theology, 28 Louvain Stud. 113
(2003) [hereinafter Rodes, On Juridicial Elements in Theology].
23. Rodes, On Juridical Elements in Theology, supra n. 22, at 114.
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He is suggesting, however, that greater sensitivity to the ways in which
theological claims can at times function rather like legal claims will
assist the religious community in grappling with them appropriately.
Leaving First Amendment scholarship to one side, it seems clear
that most normative scholarship falling within the general genre of "law
and religion" is similar in its thrust to the second group of Rodes's work.
That is, most normative interdisciplinary work in this genre attempts to
take theological insights into the nature of the person, the function of
society, and the meaning of moral responsibility and apply those insights
to jurisprudential questions. Theology, in other words, is conscripted to
provide additional strength, purpose, and richness to legal studies. But
there is no reason to think that the process of interdisciplinary
enrichment cannot go the other way. As the third group of Rodes's
writings suggest, the sort of analysis characteristic of the legal
profession can provide additional focus, precision, and nuance to
theological studies. This directionality in interdisciplinary work in law
and religion is not as prominent as its counterpart. It is, however,
equally important.
In the remainder of this essay, I would like to concentrate my
attention on material developed in Rodes's third group of writings.
More specifically, I would like to explore three sets of categories that he
has articulated over the years, which are rooted in an analytical
perspective characteristic of law, and which are also useful for
understanding theological disputes, as well as disputes about the
implications of theological claims, within a religious community. The
first set of categories, a distinction among "epistemic," "normative," and
"constitutive" legal pronouncements, articulates three different functions
of legal pronouncements within a complex and well-functioning legal
system such as our own.24 The second set of categories focuses on the
two ways in which law can instantiate moral values: it can do so
instrumentally, by employing a system of incentives and disincentives,
or it can do so didactically, by holding up a certain pattern of behavior
as worthy of emulation. The third set of categories, involving a
distinction between "Erastians" and "High Church" Christians, focuses
on two fundamentally different ways of relating the Church to the
culture that both have sturdy roots in the Christian tradition.25
Although Rodes has developed these three sets of categories more-
or-less independently of one another, it is my thesis that their
24. Rodes, What O'Clock I Say, supra n. 22, at 286.
25. Rodes, Pilgrim Law, supra n. 10, at 140-144.
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explanatory power is exponentially increased when they are combined.
"Erastians" and "High Church" Christians tend to give priority to
different functions of pronouncements in the law, for reasons internally
related to the way each understands the function of law in
communicating the moral vision of the community. They also tend to
emphasize a different method by which law accomplishes its goals. My
manner of proceeding will be as follows. I will begin by sketching
Rodes's three sets of categories. I will then attempt to construct an
integrated analytical framework that combines these three sets of
categories. Finally, I will attempt briefly to test that integrated
framework, by using it to illuminate the recent controversy that
developed among Massachusetts Catholics about the decision of
Catholic Charities of Boston to cease functioning as an adoption agency
rather than continue to place a small number of hard-to-place children
with homosexual parents.
I. THE THREE FUNCTIONS OF THE LAW:
NORMATIVE, CONSTITUTIVE, AND EPISTEMIC
Professor Rodes has argued that we need to distinguish among
three functions of legal dispositions: the normative, the epistemic, and
the constitutive. The normative function is what most non-lawyers
associate with the role of law; normative pronouncements tell people
what to do and what not to do, "with ancillary provisions perhaps saying
what will happen to us if we fail to obey. 26 The classic example of the
normative function of the law, of course, is found in the criminal code.
Do not murder, do not rape, and do not rob. If you do commit such an
act, and are found guilty of doing so by a jury of your peers, you will
suffer a significant penalty, most likely imprisonment. To those who
focus exclusively on this aspect of the legal system, it appears that the
function of law is essentially negative; its role is limited to impeding
potential malefactors from imposing their unjust will upon the rest of
society.
Other functions of law are far more positive, or at least neutral.
Rodes observes that law also performs a constitutive function; that is, it
"creat[es] a state of affairs."27 Two examples of how law does so are
found in the law of property and the law of marriage. "The execution
and delivery of a deed in proper from will make A the owner of what
was formerly B's house. A marriage ceremony in proper form will
26. Rodes, On Juridical Elements in Theology, supra n. 22, at 122.
27. Id.
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make a couple husband and wife., 28 Constitutive legal dispositions are
creative; they generate real relationships that were not previously in
being and are not physically observable. Rodes states,
[c]onstitutive legal dispositions do not as such impose obligations
at all. Their effect is metaphysical or ontological. They tell you
how to bring about some juridical state of affairs, some condition
such as adoption, marriage, tenure of a public office, or ownership
of a house that is not physically observable, and that is subject to
control by operation of law. 9
In other words, one cannot, properly speaking, disobey a
constitutive legal provision. If we fail to comply with the process it sets
forth, we simply fail to bring about the set of relationships that provision
contemplates. We do not become the legal owners of a piece of
property, we do not become husband and wife, or we do not become the
legal parents of a child born to someone else if we do not follow the
specified procedures.
Third, legal pronouncements often have, or entail, an epistemic
function, which Rodes describes as
involv[ing] an authoritative determination that such-and-such is
the case, based on an investigation or a hearing of evidence by
some person in authority, who then decides in good faith that it is
in fact the case.3°
Rodes notes that an obvious example is a jury verdict; other examples
include legislative findings of fact used to justify the enactment of a
particular law, or factual determinations by administrative agencies.31
Rodes argues that these three functions of legal pronouncements
have analogies in how various pronouncements of the Roman Catholic
Church function. This fact is not surprising to him; the Church is a
community, a "polity," and it must therefore have a structure that gives
it organization and stability. Rodes writes
The basic polity of the Church-that is, its government by pope
and bishops-is established by divine positive law. The
deployment of people and resources in accordance with that polity
is done by human law, mostly that of the Church itself, although
the state played a major part in earlier times. At every level, the
applicable laws combine constitutive and normative forms.32
28. Id.
29. Id. at 125.
30. Id. at 123.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 130.
[Vol. XXII
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The clearest place to see the intersection of the constitutive and
normative functions is in the Church's law of marriage. Natural law
prohibits sexual relationships between persons of the same sex and
between close relatives; these prohibitions are normatively recapitulated
in the Church's positive moral norms. Furthermore, they are
incorporated in the Church's constitutive norms; a purported wedding
conducted in violation of these prohibitions does not result in either a
natural marriage or a sacramental marriage.33 In other words, these
normative prohibitions relating to partners of the same sex and to
consanguinity shape the constitutive requirements for marriage. There
are also normative requirements relating to the performance of a
sacramental marriage that are not constitutive, such as the requirement
that a marriage between a Catholic and a non-Catholic receive advance
permission from the bishop. If this requirement is violated, the resulting
marriage is illicit, but not invalid.34
Finally, Rodes describes how the Church also exercises epistemic
authority, both judicially and legislatively. One paradigmatic case of
judicial epistemic authority is the proceeding for the annulment of a
marriage, which makes the factual finding that a valid marriage either
does or does not exist. A second paradigmatic case is the canonization
process, which makes a determination about whether the candidate
proposed for sainthood possessed the requisite degree of holiness.3" The
legislative exercise of epistemic authority, according to Rodes, lies in
the determinations of the magisterium, the teaching authority of the
Church expressed by the Pope and his brother bishops. As Rodes notes,
"it extends to all questions of doctrine and morals, although in the
practical application of moral principles its scope is limited by the
coordinate authority of the individual conscience. 36  He observes as
well that sometimes pastors are called to apply Catholic doctrine and
morals to matters involving factors on which they have no special
expertise.
It is often desirable for popes and bishops to address public
questions outside the strict scope of their epistemic authority in
order to ensure that Christian principles are taken into account in
public debate. Interventions of this kind (say supporting a
particular amendment of the federal minimum wage law, as
opposed to proclaiming the right of workers to a living wage) are
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. id. at 131.
36. Id.
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not really exercises of the magisterium. 37
Rodes argues that various ecclesiastical pronouncements are
fruitfully understood by analogy to legal pronouncements, not only in
terms of their functions, but also in terms of their limits of their
authority. "Normative dispositions are binding [in conscience] if they
are just, possible, and known., 38 An unjust law, in Catholic tradition,
loses much of the binding force of law.39 If compliance with a particular
legal disposition is impossible either physically or morally (e.g., one is
compelled under grave duress to do otherwise), through no fault of one's
own, then one cannot be bound in conscience to comply.40 In contrast,
purely constitutive obligations do not impose obligations at all; as Rodes
says, "[t]heir effect is metaphysical or ontological.,' 4 For example, if a
constitutive requirement for a valid marriage is a blood test on both
parties, failure to obtain the blood test does not violate a norm-it
simply means that the parties do not become husband and wife. They
are not penalized; they simply do not assume the status of a married
couple.
Epistemic pronouncements, as Rodes notes,
have the effect of justifying actions taken on the supposition that
what they determine to be the case is in fact the case, and
condemning action taken on the opposite supposition. In the
Church, they have the further effect of calling on us actually to
believe what they tell us.
4z
According to Rodes, epistemic dispositions are binding only upon
those "subject to the authority" of those making the disposition, and
"who are not better informed on the matter in question., 43 He goes on to
note that "[a]nyone who is better informed has a right to disagree, and
may have a duty to act accordingly."" An example he gives comes from
a court martial of a German submarine commander who had fired upon
and sunk a plainly labeled hospital ship in World War I. His defense,
accepted by the court, was that the German Admiralty had informed him
that the British were disguising troop ships as hospital ships. As Rodes
notes, however, if the commander had had personal knowledge that this
particular ship was, in fact, a hospital ship, he would not have been
37. Id. at 131-132.
38. Id. at 123.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 125.
42. Id. at 126.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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entitled to rely upon the epistemic determination of his superiors to
justify sinking it.45
In sum, Rodes's distinction among the three functions of law, in
both civil society and the Church, recognizes that legal pronouncements
create complicated patterns of relationship. The obligation that each
form of pronouncement elicits depends upon it function, and its implicit
presuppositions. A sophisticated understanding of law, and of how
communities are constituted in part by legal bonds, will recognize and
preserve these distinctions.
II. THE Two METHODS BY WHICH LAW PROMOTES VALUES:
DIDACTIC AND INSTRUMENTAL
Obviously, all three functions of the law pursue moral values, by
facilitating their instantiation in a given society or social structure such
as the Church. Cutting across the three functions are two methods by
which the law pursues value: the didactic and the instrumental. The
didactic operation of the law, says Rodes, "is simply a matter of
witnessing the moral standards, the moral reflection, and the social
consensus of the community. 46 The fact that the law prohibits some
activities (e.g., mayhem and murder) and encourages others (e.g.,
marriage) publicly proclaims various aspects of the community's value
system, even to persons who are not directly involved in those activities.
Rodes notes that
[t]he law plays a role that some of the political theologians refer to
as consciousness raising. And even without raised consciousness
we prefer, other things being equal, to obey the law and think of
ourselves as law-abiding citizens.47
The law achieves its goals instrumentally "when it affects people's
behavior by deploying incentives and disincentives. 48 The design and
implementation of these incentives can require thought and planning.
As Rodes observes, they
can be simple and straightforward, rewards for good behavior and
punishments for bad, or they can be complicated and indirect, as
when we try to discourage the poaching of alligators by forbidding
the sale of alligator bags or when we try to encourage investment
by lowering taxes.49
45. Id. at 126-127.
46. Rodes, Pilgrim Law, supra n. 10, at 6-7.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id.
405]
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As I noted above, the use of the didactic and instrumental methods
cuts across the three functions of the law. For example, the
paradigmatic example of the normative function of the law, a criminal
statute, includes both didactic and instrumental components. A statutory
provision against murder proclaims the inviolability of innocent human
life, while the penal sanctions provide an incentive for those not
convinced by the provision's moral vision to comply with its prohibition
anyway. The institution of legal marriage is a paradigmatic example of
the constitutive function of the law. Tax breaks given to couples who
marry proclaim the centrality of this relationship to our broader social
structure and provide an incentive to heterosexual couples to get married
rather than live together. Jury deliberations constitute a central case of
the epistemic function of law. Rules of evidence specify what can be
presented to the jury. The rule against hearsay evidence is instrumental;
its purpose is to insure that only reliable evidence be presented to the
jury. A rule against compelling one spouse to testify against another, or
prohibiting the introduction of evidence obtained under torture, is
didactic; it communicates to the society that the fact-finding process
cannot be conducted in a way that will destroy other values of deep
importance to the community.
The didactic and instrumental methods can stand in harmony with
one another;5 ° at least as often, however, they seem to be in some
tension. For example, Rodes remarks upon the tension between
instrumental and didactic approaches to sexual behavior. Should the law
encourage chastity, or should it provide free condoms to minimize the
risk of AIDS and birth control to minimize the risk of pregnancy?5 We
are all familiar with the political battles that have at their root a desire to
give priority to one or the other method in this context. It can be
tempting to reduce one method to a mere tool of the other, but Rodes
urges us to resist the temptation:
Accepting one or the other offers a certain philosophical
convenience, but either of them leads to an impoverished
jurisprudence. To refer the whole enterprise to its didactic
function tends to stifle creativity in the enforcement process. Once
you have commanded what is right and forbidden what is wrong,
and laid on the stocks and the lash for lesser infractions, the ax and
50. Rodes notes that a good example of such harmony is civil rights legislation. "The same
statutes and judicial decisions that produced injunctions, contempt citations, and reinstatement
with back pay, and cease and desist orders made people who practiced discrimination with
impunity ashamed of themselves or at least defensive .. " Id. at 7.
51. Id.
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the gibbet for greater ones, you can rest content with your
fulfillment of the practical responsibilities of your profession. You
can devote your intellectual energies to refining your values and
their application to more and more complicated fact patterns
without regard to their realization in the world. On the other hand,
referring everything to the instrumental function tends to obfuscate
the applicable values. You tend to find more and more
sophisticated ways of accomplishing things, while paying less and
less attention to what it is you are trying to-accomplish. The end
result is apt to be a legal system that is all realization and no
values.
52
In Rodes's view, therefore, we need to keep both methods in mind
if we are to design an adequately balanced legal system. He contends
that classical and medieval legal systems succumbed to the temptation to
focus nearly exclusively on the didactic method.
The late fifth-century Theodosian Code bears witness to the last
days of the Roman Empire, when the supreme authority could find
nothing better to do with the legal system than sit in the midst of
the growing chaos issuinA more and more commands that fewer
and fewer people obeyed.
In contrast, most modem legal thought places almost exclusive
emphasis on the instrumental method.
It concentrates on realizations with only token regard for the
values being realized. It is dominated by technical metaphors such
as Roscoe Pound's "social engineering." It licenses the
deployment of more and more sophisticated legal technologies
with less and less regard for what they are supposed to be
accomplishing.54
III. THE Two STRATEGIES FOR RELATING THE CHURCH TO THE WORLD:
ERASTIAN AND HIGH CHURCH
Rodes's historical study of the relationship of Church and state in
England has led him to the conclusion that there are two basic strategies
for relating the Church to the world: Erastian55 and High Church.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Id. at 8.
54. Id. at 9.
55. Rodes describes the origin of this label in the following way:
The vision of the church as sharing the historical vicissitudes of the rest of society I call
Erastian. Erastus (1524-83) was a Swiss theologian who taught that the church had no
proper coercive jurisdiction independent of the civil magistrate. His name became
attached to those Anglicans who were content with the substantial role played by Crown
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According to Rodes, the Erastian approach is "based on a general unity
of function between church and state"; it is operative "to the extent that
Christianity is viewed as a social agenda and a lifestyle for whole
peoples. 56 Rodes notes that Erastians emphasize filling the gaps in the
social service work of the government. "The provisions of schools and
hospitals and the relief of the poor have been examples in many times
and places."5 " Rodes observes that the Erastian approach has
historically been concerned with inculcating ideals of sexual morality.
"The enforcement of chastity has usually fallen into this category: the
significant involvement of the coercive power of the state has generally
proved unfortunate, as in The Scarlet Letter or Measure for Measure.,58
Rodes also notes that social justice and civil rights have been matters for
concern for the Church on its Erastian side rather than for the state.
Either the values concerned, like chastity and temperance, have
commanded a moral consensus that society was not prepared to
enforce coercively, or they have formed part of a Christian agenda
that the church was more willing to propose than the society was
willing to accept.59
In contrast, Rodes denominates as High Church those who present
an eschatological witness over and against society.60 He uses the term
to cover any view of the church as an institutional embodiment of
the transcendence, the otherness of God and of the divine
judgment that attaches to every existing society for not being the
Kingdom of God.6'
Centrally, High Church views do not see themselves as advancing a
political program.
The High Church component of the Church's presence cannot
exactly be called an agenda. The reason it is High Church is that it
points to human purposes beyond the reach of society, and to
social shortcomings for which the society has no remedy.
High Church views, according to Rodes, tend to promote a vision of the
and Parliament in the affairs of their Church.
Id. at 141.
56. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Pluralist Christendom and the Christian Civil Magistrate, 8 Cap. U.
L. Rev. 413, 418 (1979) [hereinafter Rodes, Pluralist Christendom].
57. Rodes, Pilgrim Law, supra, n. 10, at 141.
58. Id. at 142.
59. Id.
60. He notes that "[tihe term was originally applied to those Anglicans who saw the polity
and autonomy of the church as divinely established, or who stressed the sacramental and liturgical
aspects of the Christian life rather than the personal and evangelical aspects." Id. at 141.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 142.
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institutional Church as a sanctuary against the corrupt world. But there
are times when the High Church approach does venture into political
life: He notes that
[h]igh Churchmanship sometimes goes beyond an eschatological
stance, but when it does, it tends to move toward a domination of
civil society by ecclesiastical authority which is not acceptable
either theologically or politically.63
Rodes recognizes that both approaches to the relationship between
Church and culture are necessary. He also sees that it is difficult to
distinguish them at times; which one is more prominent may depend
upon the way things are going in a particular society.
When a work is progressing nicely and attracting good support,
utilitarian, Erastian perceptions of it are apt to be uppermost in
people's minds. Conversely when the effect on society becomes
harder to achieve, or more limited by considerations proper to the
art of the possible, those involved in the work are more apt to
content themselves with a non-utilitarian, High Church witness,
and the mutual support that they derive from bearing that witness
in common.
64
Rodes also argues that these approaches take somewhat different
forms in different cultures and their associated economic and political
systems. Drawing upon the insights of Milovan Djilas's The New
Class,65 Rodes has maintained that the ruling class of both capitalist and
socialist economies was composed of bureaucrats and managers, who
alone were capable of providing the expertise that allowed such
complicated economies to function.66 Consequently, in our society
today, "[m]anagerial Erastianism enlists the Church in an extensive
consortium of organizations and experts engaged in the solving of
problems. 67 Spiritual concerns, maintains Rodes, can take too much of
a back seat to the need to ameliorate social injustice and human
suffering.68
What form does a High Church approach take in a capitalistic
economic framework dominated by managers? Rodes argues that
"[w]ith the advent of managerialism, a good deal of High Church
63. Rodes, Pluralist Christendom, supra n. 56, at 418.
64. Rodes, Pilgrim Law, supra n. 10, at 143.
65. Djilas, supra n. 12.
66. For a succinct summary of the influence of Djilas on Rodes's work, see Schaffer, supra n.
9, at 742-746.
67. Rodes, Pilgrim Law, supra n. 10, at 153.
68. Id. at 153-154.
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thinking has shifted from the individual to the group., 69 High Church
sensibilities tend to be the prerogative of an elite; "people who had
enough education to appropriate a fairly complex set of doctrines and
who did not need to spend much time and thought on material needs. 7 °
Rodes contends that
[w]here Erastianism creates a danger of reducing the Word and the
sacraments to the level of a class-bound secular agenda, High
Churchmanship creates a danger of exalting some class-bound
secular agenda to the level of Word and sacraments. 7'
IV. INTEGRATING THE THREE SETS OF CATEGORIES
Robert Rodes has provided us with a set of helpful analytical tools
with which to approach not only past disputes about how to instantiate
the Gospel in a given culture, but also to consider the disputes which
currently divide many Christian communities. I would like to suggest,
however, that the power of these tools will be greatly increased if we
make some effort to integrate them. More specifically, I would like to
suggest that Erastians and High Churchpeople tend to give priority to
different functions of the law, as well as to different methods for
achieving its end.
This difference in priority ought not to be surprising. High
Churchpeople are acutely sensitive to the radical way in which the
Kingdom of God differs from all worldly kingdoms. While God's
kingdom will be fully manifest only in the eschaton, it is present among
us in embryonic form in the Church, particularly the sacramental life of
the Church. The primary task of believers, therefore, is to witness to the
values of the divine Kingdom, to prevent their submersion in the
hopelessly compromised value system of the secular world. When they
turn their attention to the secular world, High Churchpeople tend to see
their major role as proclaiming and protecting the basic insights of the
natural law, which represents God's basic intent for the normative shape
of human life and human society. They see those insights as under
constant threat by secular values, and in need of constant reinforcement
by religious believers, whose commitment to the natural law is fortified
by situating it in its proper place in the divine plan, to which they have
access through the divinely guided magisterium of the Church.
69. Id. at 156.
70. Id. at 157.
71. Id. at 154.
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In the context of their dealings with the secular world, Erastians
tend to emphasize creation and incarnation rather than the eschatological
consummation of the divine plan. They tend to focus on the many
corporal and spiritual works of mercy that need to be performed here
and now, rather than devoting too much attention to the nature and
function of the eschatological kingdom of God. Moreover, they are not
leery about cooperation with all people of good will, whether or not they
are believers, because they emphasize our common character as children
of the God who created, redeems, and sustains us all. They are more
open to the discernment of the requirements of natural law inductively
rather than deductively; they take seriously not only the moral wisdom
of the institutional Church, but also the moral wisdom of ordinary
people whom they consider to be of good character, whatever their
professed belief systems.
So how would this difference in emphasis with respect to the
relationship of the Church to the world affect the way in which Erastians
and High Churchpeople approach Rodes's two other sets of categories?
Let us begin with Rodes's distinction among the three functions of law,
the normative, the constitutive, and the epistemic. In my view, Erastians
are more likely to emphasize the normative aspect of law, while High
Churchpeople are more likely to stress its epistemic function. At first,
this may seem counterintuitive: High Churchpeople, after all, tend to be
rigorists, while Erastians tend to be more willing to compromise with
political necessity.
Yet a deeper consideration of the situation may reveal some
surprising twists. It seems, to me at least, that High Churchpeople
consider it their primary duty to preach the kingdom of God, unseen but
already present in embryonic form in our midst. They see their task as
breaking through the confusion and self-deception caused by both
individual sin and collective patterns of sin, in order to convey a clear
and uncompromising understanding of God's loving plan for human life.
To the extent that secular law touches upon matters determined by that
plan (e.g., matters determined by natural law), secular law must also be
clear and unequivocal about the moral truth. For many Catholic High
Churchpeople, the emphasis on the epistemological function of the law
is consonant with their definition of law, which finds its roots in the
Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas, the
eternal law is nothing more or less than God's plan for the entire
world.72 Whereas non-rational creatures participate in the eternal law
72. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica vol. 2, 993, pt. 1-II, q. 91, art. 1 (Fathers of the
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solely by instinct, human beings also participate in the eternal law by
using their practical reason. Natural law, for Aquinas, is nothing other
than the human person's participation in the eternal law, in and through
the exercise of his or her practical reason.73 The making of positive law
involves articulating the requirements of natural law for those who are
unable to grasp them, and fleshing out those requirements in particular
ways to fit the needs of a particular community.7 4 Consequently, in a
just community, the positive law reliably reflects the basic content of the
natural law.75
The overwhelming priority for High Churchpeople in both
dogmatic and moral theology is purity and comprehensiveness of
teaching. High Churchpeople believe that no human measures are likely
to be effective in bringing about the kingdom of God, that kingdom will
be made manifest in God's own time. Consequently, they are less
interested in moving incrementally toward a realization of the
kingdom's values than they are in proclaiming those values in all their
radicalism, all their fullness. In a nutshell, they are concerned with
ensuring that the law reflects and proclaims the truths of the natural law
-the epistemic function of law is primary.
In contrast, Erastians are centrally concerned with improving this
world, despite its enduring imperfections. As Rodes notes, Erastians
focus on "presenting and even implementing a practical agenda for the
whole society, and for offering a lifestyle within the reach of people
with average or below average spiritual capacity and moral fiber. 76
Erastians are concerned, therefore, with accomplishing certain pragmatic
goals in order to better society, and moving persons and resources in
order to accomplish those goals. Consequently, they are most concerned
with the normative function of the law; they want to regularize means
for insuring that the basic social welfare needs of the most vulnerable
members of society are met. Because they are more likely to see Church
and state as more-or-less harmonious partners in the betterment of
society, they are more likely to see the secular legal system as one tool
that can be used in accomplishing their goals. In a nutshell, the
normative function of law is primary.
What about the constitutive function of law? In my view, it is a
mediating category, which Erastians and High Churchpeople both tend
English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981).
73. Id. at 996, pt. I-lI, q. 91, art. 2.
74. Id. at 1013-1017, pt. I-IL, q. 95.
75. Id.
76. Rodes, Pluralist Christendom, supra n. 56, at 417.
[Vol. XXII
ERASTIAN & HIGH CHURCH APPROACHES
to interpret in terms of the requirements of the more extreme category
which they favor. So Erastians see the constitutive function of the law
as one more tool to use on the pilgrimage to the kingdom of God, and in
particular in providing for the basic needs of suffering and sinful people.
They are more inclined, therefore to recognize, organize, and attempt to
ameliorate relationships and patterns of behavior that are already in
existence, whether or not they are morally appropriate from the point of
view of the Kingdom of God fully instantiated. For example, Erastians
would be more likely to create a category of legal prostitution, which
would confer legal protection to a brothel on the condition that it met
certain public health and safety requirements.
Erastians would indignantly deny the charge that such a strategy
amounted to condoning prostitution; instead, they would argue that they
were minimizing the unjust effects of a pattern of behavior that was
impossible to eradicate from human society. Similarly, Erastians would
be more likely to endorse the creation of institutions and bonds that
facilitated responsibility and mutual care among human beings, no
matter how fallen. The creations of legal categories to cover gay
marriage, polygamous marriage, or even "marriage lite" (a set of defined
but limited responsibilities for those who have decided to live with one
another without benefit of marriage) would be justified by Erastians on
the basis of the empirical evidence: if such institutions were thought
capable of minimizing injustice by insuring that parties actually were not
penalized excessively for making and relying upon promises of some
sort of support and protection to one another. It is not, of course, that
Erastians are unable to appreciate the importance of upholding ideals in
areas of marriage and sexuality; however, they would be more likely
than High Churchpeople to consider whether proclaiming the ideal was
more likely than regulating the reality to produce a more just and
humane set of relationships.
In contrast, High Churchpeople will be more inclined to say, at the
very least, that the constitutive function of the secular law should not
undermine or contradict God's providential determinations about what is
and is not the case. So marriage, for example, by God's metaphysical
and moral design, simply is the lifelong commitment of one man and
one woman. The constitutive arrangements recognized by the state, and
a fortiori, by the Church, ought not to proclaim that the impossible is
possible, no matter how much good might result from a pragmatic
perspective. The most important task of the Church is to proclaim the
unadulterated truth. Ideally, the legal system would do the same in
matters pertaining to natural law. If, however, Christians are
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unfortunate enough to be in a legal system where sin and self-deception
have masked the requirements of the natural law, their primary
responsibility is to proclaim those requirements clearly and without any
appearance of compromise.
So in an environment that they perceive as determinedly secular
and therefore hostile to Christian faith, High Churchpeople are
especially reluctant to approve what the Catholic moral tradition has
traditionally called "cooperation with evil"-the performance of an
action which facilitates in some way the wrongful action of another.
From their perspective, cooperation with evil is one thing in a society
that as a whole honors and accept Christian values, including the basic
requirements of natural law; it is different thing entirely in a secular
society that treats those values with contempt or indifference." Whereas
Erastians tend to accept with resignation the inevitability of some form
of cooperation with evil, High Churchpeople are far more worried about
its deleterious effect upon the purity of the Christian witness.
The issue of cooperation with evil is instructive. The Catholic
moral tradition has developed an elaborate, if not abstruse, matrix in
order to help people differentiate between permissible and impermissible
cooperation with evil. 78  Both Erastians and High Churchpeople
acknowledge the relevance of that matrix; nonetheless, they frequently
come to different judgments about whether cooperation is acceptable.79
Their differences, in my judgment, come down to different priorities:
Erastians place a greater emphasis on performing the corporal works of
mercy to assist people in need, and High Churchpeople give greater
importance to proclaiming the holiness of life in the Kingdom of God.
So Erastian Catholics are likely to justify giving condoms to persons at
77. It seems to me that the position of Australian Bishop Anthony Fisher, O.P., reflects this
sensitivity to the moral stance of the broader culture. See Anthony Fisher, Cooperation in Evil:
Understanding the Issues, in Cooperation, Complicity & Conscience: Problems in Healthcare,
Science, Law, and Public Policy 27 (Helen Watt ed., Linacre Centre 2005) [hereinafter Fisher,
Understanding Cooperation in Evil].
78. As a technical term of moral theology, "cooperation with evil" is generally used to
describe a situation in which one agent (the "cooperator") faces a situation in which his or her act
will somehow contribute, in a subordinate way, to a morally unacceptable action plan designed
and controlled by someone else (the "principal agent"). For a good introduction to the categories
of the matrix used by traditional moralists, see Anthony Fisher, Co-operation in Evil, 44 Cath.
Med. Q. 15 (Feb. 1994).
79. Compare Fisher, Understanding Cooperation in Evil, supra n. 77; with M. Cathleen
Kaveny, Tax Lawyers, Prophets, and Pilgrims: A Response to Anthony Fisher, in Cooperation,
Complicity & Conscience: Problems in Healthcare, Science, Law, and Public Policy, supra n. 77,
at 65. In Rodes's terms, Bishop Fisher could be understood as adopting more of a High Church
approach to cooperation with evil, while I could be seen as adopting more of an Erastian approach
to the question of cooperation with evil.
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risk of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa under the principle of cooperation
with evil, while High Churchpeople are likely to resist such a program
on the grounds that it could be construed to encourage sexual activity
outside of marriage, which is inconsistent with the natural law.
Finally, and not surprisingly, Erastians and High Churchpeople
differ in the respect and emphasis each places on Rodes's two methods
of law, the didactic and the instrumental. Needless to say, High
Churchpeople favor the didactic; they see the central job of the Church's
magisterium (and by extension, the secular government) as proclaiming
the truth of the matter about various controverted moral issues. For
reasons described above, they are less concerned about whether the mere
proclamation of the truth is the best method of bringing about the social
reality they seek to bring about; it is God's job, not theirs, to render
human fidelity to divine truth effective. In contrast, Erastians are more
concerned with using the instrumental methods of the law to bring about
incremental improvement in the human situation. If the best way to
secure a particularly desirable state of affairs is not to preach about it,
but to provide incentives to facilitate its implementation, so be it.
Erastians see High Churchpeople as myopically focused on
idealized visions of reality; this myopia, they believe, leads them to
ignore the possibilities for incremental improvement. High
Churchpeople, for their part, see Erastians as too focused on the
immanent to give proper respect to the true source and ground of all that
is: God and God's plan for human beings, as set forth in Scripture and
(for Catholics ) in the authoritative tradition as well. An example of this
difference in viewpoint can be found in different strategies pro-life
Catholics have taken regarding abortion law in recent years. Erastians
tend to favor incentives to reduce abortion rates, such as prenatal
support, generous subsidies to unwed mothers, and high quality public
education from preschool to college. In contrast, High Churchpeople
tend to place more emphasis on the unequivocal didactic power of an
absolute prohibition. (It is important to note that most people in this
camp do not favor criminal penalties against the woman seeking an
abortion, but against the doctor performing it instead.) Erastians point
out that the lowest abortion rates in the West are found in those
countries which do not penalize abortion, at least in the early weeks, but
instead provide incentives for a woman to carry her baby to term.8 ° In
response, High Churchpeople will state that the fundamental purpose of
80. For a modified Erastian viewpoint that makes this argument, see Mary Ann Glendon,
Abortion and Divorce in Western Law ch. 1 (Harv. U. Press 1987).
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the law is not primarily to be immediately and tangibly effective, but
instead to proclaim the unequivocal dignity of unborn human life. From
the High Church perspective, a legislative compromise may undermine
the crucial didactic function of the law.81
V. A TEST CASE: CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF BOSTON AND ADOPTION BY
HOMOSEXUAL PARENTS
I would like to conduct a brief test of my theory that an integrated
approach to Rodes's three sets of categories powerfully increases their
explanatory power. The subject matter of my test will be the
contretemps that developed in the fall of 2005 and the spring of 2006
over whether or not Catholic Charities of Boston should have continued
to place children with homosexual couples as a condition of maintaining
their status as a licensed adoption agency in the state of Massachusetts.
In the end, Boston Catholic Charities decided to cease all work in the
adoption area rather than directly contravene a directive of the Vatican
prohibiting Catholic organizations from placing children with same-sex
couples as adoptive parents.
In examining this controversy, my remarks will be narrowly
restricted: they will not encompass the broader societal and religious
debate over whether or not homosexual acts are morally justified. Quite
obviously, if one thinks that the official teaching of the Catholic Church
on this matter is misguided, one will have little sympathy for the
ultimate decision of Boston Catholic Charities. My concentration,
therefore, will be upon the disagreements that developed between and
among Catholics (and others) who do not seem themselves as
challenging the underlying teaching of the Church on the morality of
homosexual activity. These disagreements centered on whether respect
for that teaching required Catholic Charities to cease its good work in
placing children with adoptive families rather than place a small number
of children with gay couples.
But first, some background. In the fall of 2005, The Boston Globe
reported that Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Boston had placed
thirteen children for adoption with homosexual couples.82 These
adoptions had taken place over an eighteen-year period, in which
Catholic Charities had arranged for the adoptions of a total of seven
81. For a passionate High Church viewpoint that makes this argument, see Colin Harte,
Changing Unjust Laws Justly: Pro-Life Solidarity with The "Last and Least " (Cath. U. Am. Press
2005).
82. Patricia Wen, Archdiocesan Agency Aids in Adoptions by Gays, The Boston Globe Al
(Oct. 22, 2005).
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hundred twenty (720) children.83 The agency was between a rock and a
hard place. On the one hand, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
required that all adoption agencies agree to abide by its non-
discrimination clause as a condition of licensure.84 On the other hand, in
2003, the Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith issued a
document on same-sex marriage and civil unions, which claimed that it
was gravely immoral to place a child for adoption with a same-sex
couple.85 In a nutshell, then, the State seemed categorically to require
Catholic Charities to engage in practices which the Church categorically
prohibited.
The controversy continued for approximately six months. The
Massachusetts Catholic Conference formed a committee to review the
issue in November 2005;86 its work resulted in a statement 87 issued on
83. Id.
84. Agencies that provide adoption services need a license from the Massachusetts
Department of Early Education and Care. 102 Code of Mass. Reg. 1.03 (1) (2005) provides that
The licensee shall not discriminate in providing services to children and their families on
the basis of race, religion, cultural heritage, political beliefs, national origin, marital
status, sexual orientation or disability. A statement that the program does not
discriminate on these bases shall be made part of the written statement of purpose where
required.
Operating without a license is not an option. Id. at 1.03 (2) ("No persons shall operate or purport
to operate a program licensable by the Office of Child Care services without a license or
approval.").
85. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give
Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons Pt. III, sec. 7, 3 (June 3, 2003)
(available at http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc con-cfaith-
doc_20030731 _homosexual-unionsen.html):
As experience has shown, the absence of sexual complementarity in these [homosexual]
unions creates obstacles in the normal development of children who would be placed in
the care of such persons. They would be deprived of the experience of either fatherhood
or motherhood. Allowing children to be adopted by persons living in such unions would
actually mean doing violence to these children, in the sense that their condition of
dependency would be used to place them in an environment that is not conducive to their
full human development. This is gravely immoral and in open contradiction to the
principle, recognized also in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
that the best interests of the child, as the weaker and more vulnerable party, are to be the
paramount consideration in every case.
86. Patricia Wen, Church Reviews Role in Gay Adoptions, The Boston Globe B2 (Nov. 4,
2005).
87. Statement of the Massachusetts Catholic Conference on Behalf of Archbishop Sean P.
O'Malley (Boston), Bishop George W. Coleman (Fall River), Bishop Timothy A. McDonnell
(Springfield), and Bishop Robert J. McManus (Worcester) (Mass. Cath. Conf. Feb. 28, 2006)
(available at http://www.macathconf.org/06-Bishops%20Statement%20on%20Adoption%20
FINAL%2002-28.pdf). The key paragraph reads as follows:
Because of the Church's teaching, Catholic agencies may not provide adoptions to same
sex couples. Hence we intend to seek relief from the regulatory requirements of the
Commonwealth on this issue. We do this in the hope that we will be able to continue
focusing our attention on serving children in need of adoption, and to do so in a way
which does not conflict with Catholic teaching and practice. We are asking the
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
February 26, 2006, by the Commonwealth's four Catholic bishops.8
They called upon state legislators to grant Catholic adoption agencies an
exemption to the requirement of equal treatment of same-sex couples on
the grounds of religious freedom This stance put them at odds with the
board of trustees of Boston Catholic Charities, which had voted
unanimously in December 2005 to support the continued placement of
children with gay couples for adoption.89 In response to the statement,
seven members of the board resigned.90 Governor Mitt Romney stated
that he could not waive the anti-discrimination laws, and suggested that
the bishops file a bill to that effect with the legislature. 9' State
legislators informed Church leaders that such a proposal had no chance
of passing.92
All efforts to reach a political compromise failed. In March, the
board of trustees of Boston Catholic Charities voted to end all adoption
services.93 In a joint statement issued on March 10, 2006, the
organization's president, Rev. J. Brian Hehir, and the chair of its board
of trustees, Jeffrey Kaneb, acknowledged,
[W]e have encountered a dilemma we cannot resolve. In spite of
much effort and analysis, Catholic Charities of Boston finds that it
cannot reconcile the teaching of the Church, which guides our
work, and the statutes and regulations of the Commonwealth.9 4
The agency then began the work of transitioning its caseload, which
included many hard-to-place children, to other adoption agencies, a task
which it projected to be completed by the end of June 2006.9' There was
Commonwealth to respect the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom and allow
the Catholic Church to continue serving children in need of adoption without violating
the tenets of our faith.
Id. at 4.
88. Patricia Wen, Bishops to Oppose Adoption by Gays, The Boston Globe Al (Feb. 16,
2006).
89. Id.
90. Patricia Wen, Seven Quit Charity Over Policy of Bishops, The Boston Globe AI (Mar. 2,
2006). Later, an eighth member resigned as well. Patricia Wen, In Break from Romney, Healy
Raps Gay Adoption Exclusion, The Boston Globe B4 (Mar. 3, 2006).
91. Patricia Wen, Bishops Dealt Setback in Pursuit of Gay Adoption Exemption, The Boston
Globe B3 (Feb. 17, 2006).
92. Patricia Wen, Bishops' Gay Ban May Cost Millions: Private Donors Wary of Adoption
Policy, The Boston Globe AI (Mar. 5, 2006).
93. Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, The Boston Globe Al
(Mar. 11, 2006).
94. J. Bryan Hehir & Jeffrey Kaneb, Statement of Catholic Charities, Archdiocese of Boston,
On Adoption Programs 3 (Mar. 10, 2006) (available at http://www.rcab.org/News/releases/2006/
statement060310-2.html).
95. Viewed from a financial perspective, adoption services constituted only a small portion of
the portfolio of Boston Catholic Charities. In the fiscal year 2005, its total revenue was $37
million; its reimbursement for adoption services comprised only $1 million. Catholic Charities,
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a great deal of public chagrin because no one doubted that Catholic
Charities had proven itself to be a tireless advocate of children,
particularly hard-to-place children. Patricia Wen, the reporter for The
Boston Globe who broke the story the previous fall, wrote an article
describing how the agency was preparing to end over a century of
providing adoption services to the greater Boston area.96 It reads like an
obituary.
So how do Professor Rodes's categories, used in an integrated
manner, help us to understand this heart-wrenching controversy? Let us
begin with a High Church approach, which I believe is exemplified in
the interview conducted by The Boston Globe with Archbishop Sean
O'Malley immediately before he went to Rome to be created a cardinal
by Pope Benedict XVI in March 2006. When pressed to articulate the
Vatican's concern in these matters, he emphasized the importance of a
clear and unambiguous witness to the nature of marriage proclaimed by
the Church:
I understand the Holy See's concern that in our works of mercy, in
our social programs, that we must be consistent in teaching the
Catholic faith in one voice. And certainly the church's teaching on
marriage is very central to our beliefs and how we see that the
institution of marriage in today's world is very much threatened on
many fronts, and yet it is the very cornerstone of society. And the
best way for a child to be raised is to be conceived and nurtured by
committed, loving parents in marriage. And so, for the church, in
our social services activities and other works of mercy, we need to
be consistent. And it was your newspaper that pointed out the
anomaly to us, and we have tried to deal with that.9
The overriding concern for O'Malley is the purity of the message
conveyed by the participation of Catholic institutions in the adoption
process. The most important function of the secular law, especially in
this time of moral confusion, is its epistemic function: It should embody
the definition of marriage and family demanded by natural law and
promulgated in season and out by the Church. The constitutive function
of the law; i.e., the institutions and relationships that it brings into being,
Archdiocese of Boston, Catholic Charities of Boston to Transition Adoption Placement Services
to Child & Family Services (Apr. 28, 2006) (available at http://www.ccab.org/
whatsnew.htm#adoptionjtransition).
96. Patricia Wen, "They Cared for the Children": Amid Shifting Social Winds, Catholic
Charities Prepares to End its 103 Years of Finding Homes for Foster Children and Evolving
Families, The Boston Globe Al (June 25, 2006).
97. A Globe Conversation with Archbishop O'Malley, transcript, The Boston Globe Question
7 (Mar. 19, 2006) (available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/
2006/03/19/omalleytranscript).
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should harmoniously reflect and support its epistemic function. The
clarity of the Church's moral message, and the congruence of its
charitable activities with that message, is particularly important, in view
of the fact that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has extended the
definition of marriage to include same-sex couples.
More specifically, to those who adopt this position, the
fundamental problem with the 2003 decision of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts declaring it unconstitutional to limit marriage to
heterosexual couples98 is epistemological, not moral. More specifically,
the fundamental problem with the decision is not primarily that it
legitimates sexual activity between two people of the same sex. It is
rather that it incorporates an incorrect definition of marriage, as
something other than the permanent and exclusive union of one man and
one woman.99 Constitutively, then, the institution of marriage as defined
by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts subverts the epistemic function
of the law-its duty to embody the truth about the nature of marriage.
Normatively, in this time of great epistemic crisis, it is of paramount
importance that Catholic institutions behave in ways that testify to that
threatened truth. What good is it, from this perspective, if Catholic
Charities helps hundreds of children in crisis if it undermines the stable
family life of thousands more in the process?
The Erastians approach the situation from a very different vantage
point, which is encapsulated in the title to a Commonweal editorial on
the controversy: "Abandoned Children." Here are the first two
paragraphs:
In any given year, tragedy, family dysfunction, poverty, neglect,
and abuse separate hundreds of thousands of children from their
birth parents.
When adoption cannot be arranged, may of these children find
themselves moved from one foster family to another. Finding a
permanent home for abused, handicapped, or troubled children is
especially hard. In such cases, objections are rarely raised when
prospective adoptive parents happen to be gays or lesbians.
Whatever one's views about the morality of homosexuality, it is
hard to understand how an orphaned or abandoned child does not
benefit from being placed in a loving home.100
98. Goodridge v. Mass. Dept. Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
99. From this perspective, same-sex marriage is not so much wrong as impossible-a
contradiction in terms. See e.g. William E. May, On the Impossibility of Same-Sex Marriage: A
Review of Catholic Teaching, 4 Natl. Cath. Bioethics Q. 303 (2004).
100. Editorial, Abandoned Children, 100 Commonweal 5 (Mar. 24, 2006) (available at
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For the Erastians, the primary imperative for both the state and the
Church at this point in time is to help the vulnerable members of the
community pick up the pieces after sin and misfortune have worked
their ravages. The Erastians, in other words, are most concerned about
the normative function of law: the law's purpose in this context is to
ensure that as children are cared for by loving families, by encouraging
as many people as possible to respond compassionately to children in
desperate need of a home. The constitutive function follows the
normative function: if the only people willing to take a bruised or
battered child are not exactly Ozzie and Harriet, so be it. It may not be
perfect, but it's much better than the alternative of leaving hard-to-place
children to languish in foster care. To those who take this position, the
primary imperative is to care for the particular children now in our
charge. To refuse to ameliorate their situation by placing them for
adoption with a same-sex couple because of a general commitment to
the social value of heterosexual marriage strikes Erastians as heartless.
I suspect that underlying the differences between these two groups
can be accounted for by differing perspectives on how to deal with
tragedy. In the introduction to this essay, I noted Professor Rodes's
insistence that the ability to deal with tragedy is an essential feature of
pilgrim law. He writes,
[a] Christian jurisprudence, therefore, must cope with tragedy. It
must bear witness to redemption, and as far as possible further it.
It is here that pilgrim law provides an essential complement to
natural law, which is prelapsarian in its outlook and has no answer
to anyone's failure to live up to what it prescribes.' 0 '
Broken families. Bruised children. Moral uncertainty. Practical
uncertainty about the best way to pick up the pieces. All are aspects of
the tragic nature of human life. Although we are redeemed from sin, we
are not fully healed from its effects, individually or collectively. In this
debate about Boston Catholic Charities, Erastians place their emphasis
on picking up the pieces after tragedy has wreaked its devastation-they
see the faces of the particular children languishing in foster care and in
need of a loving home. They fear that the High Churchpeople are
pressing the requirements of natural law in the manner alluded to by
Rodes: they "have no answer to anyone's failure to live up to what it
http://www.commonwealmagazine.org/article.php3?id-article= 1 566&varrecherche= ...abandoned
+children) claims that "both the bishops and the Massachusetts legislature are wrong"-the
legislature for not granting an exemption to Catholic Charities in the first instance, and Catholic
Charities for not continuing to provide adoption services despite the refusal of the exemption.
101. Rodes, Pilgrim Law, supra n. 10, at 12-13.
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prescribes."' 02 And indeed, some High Churchpeople may be guilty as
charged. But at their best, High Churchpeople are arguing on behalf of
prevention: the best way to prevent this type of tragedy from expanding
its sway upon human life is by promoting and protecting the only
institution that has proven more-or-less capable of raising healthy
children under a variety of adverse and even tragic social and economic
circumstances: the traditional family.
10 3
Thinking of the debate among Catholics in Boston as a
disagreement about the best way to respond to human tragedy will not,
of course, resolve the debate. Furthermore, it does nothing to address
the more wide-ranging debates that I deliberately set to one side in this
essay, such as the moral status of the traditional family itself.
Nonetheless, by conceptualizing the debate in this way, we might be less
inclined to demonize those who disagree with us on hard questions.
And that outcome, it strikes me, would be one which Robert Rodes
would heartily support.
102. Id.
103. See Commonweal, supra n. 99, at 5 (explicitly acknowledging this point about the track-
record of the traditional family).
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